CHANGLANG, (Arunachal), April 26 ? A week?s merriment of song, dance, food and wine began here yesterday, as part of the Moh Mol festivities of the Tangsa community of the Changlang district. However, this year?s festivities have been marred by the growing influence of the IM faction of the NSCN. Everyone here knows that after the cadres of the NSCN(IM) infiltrated into this district, life has not been the same for the general population here. Changling district has a Tangsa population of about 40,000. The Tangsas are a part of the greater Naga society, while the Tangsas themselves comprise of 16 sub-tribes (there are some who say this number is 26). Asked to name each of the sub-tribes of the Tangsa community, K Mamai, district statistical officer here, could provide the following names: Lungchang, Jugli, Mossang, Longri, Kimching, Mungrey, Kourang, Longfi, Havi, Tonglim, Ponthai, Tikhak, Uyngkuk, Sangwal and Champhang.
Though the Tangsas are a part of the Naga community, few seem to incline themselves with the Naga insurgents. But given a choice, they have less dislike for the Khaplang faction than the Issac-Muivah faction. There are several reasons to this. The militants belonging to the IM faction are more aggressive than their Khaplang counterparts. The IM cadres ask for larger sums of money as ?tax? and they have also taken up the task of converting the Tangsas to Christianity: on many an occasion, by using force. Government officials here are alarmed at the growing influence of the IM faction. So much so, even Government employees are being forced to part with two per cent of their incomes to the militants? coffers. Those doing business have a heavier ?tax burden? : they have to cough up ten per cent of their earnings. It is a matter of concern that the Arunachal Pradesh Government has done little to tackle the problem of Naga insurgency in the eastern districts, chiefly Tirap and Changlang. All it has done is to entrust the job of flushing out the militants on the Second Mountain Division of the Army. Here too, the Army is in a spot, because unlike in Assam, there is no Unified Command Structure in this State. Hence, all that the Army can do is to take up specific assignments, like following up an ambush. Or, at best, take to routine patrolling. The second step seldom helps.
After speaking to a cross section of the general population here, it could be ascertained that the locals here are sore that the insurgents have chosen to make Changlang their base. The locals here are a peace and fun loving community. May be this characteristic worked to their detriment. Such is the fear of the militant here that even senior Government officials dare not utter a word against the militants. Except, of course, in private and that too, ?strictly off the record.? It is from such ?off the record? statements that this correspondent could gauge the locals? disdain for the insurgents. A major cause for the disdain is the ?forcible conversion spree? that has been initiated by the IM cadre militants. The Tangsas are animists, with Rang Frah as the presiding deity. Even the Hindus are being asked to embrace Christianity.
The NSCN militants tell the locals that their ceasefire agreement with the Government holds good in Arunachal Pradesh too. However, the security forces as well as State Government officials aver that the ceasefire is applicable only in Nagaland, where a monitoring cell is operational. The militants? claim of the ceasefire agreement is chiefly to mislead the security agencies. Now, the latter have smarted from this propaganda and the result is that any NSCN militant in Arunachal Pradesh is either to be sent back to Nagaland or arrested. Both the tasks are easier said than done.
In the meanwhile, the occasional ambushes on the security personnel by Naga militants (mostly IM cadres) has not helped matters. As far as the security forces are concerned, any NSCN cadre in Arunachal Pradesh is to be treated as foe. The scenario in eastern Arunachal is disquieting. It is thus a matter of time before the Government makes up its mind on the matter. Whether to let the militants have a free run or to try to arrive at solutions.